The Weak Law of Large Numbers is traced chronologically from its inception as Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem in 1713, through De Moivre's Theorem, to ultimate forms due to Uspensky and Khinchin in the 1930s, and beyond. Both aspects of Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem: 1. As limit theorem (sample size n → ∞), and: 2. Determining sufficiently large sample size for specified precision, for known and also unknown p (the inversion problem), are studied, in frequentist and Bayesian settings. The Bienaymé-Chebyshev Inequality is shown to be a meeting point of the French and Russian directions in the history. Particular emphasis is given to less well-known aspects especially of the Russian direction, with the work of Chebyshev, Markov (the organizer of Bicentennial celebrations), and S.N. Bernstein as focal points.
1. Introduction 1.1. Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem was much more than the first instance of what came to be know in later times as the Weak Law of Large Numbers (WLLN). In modern notation Bernoulli showed that, for fixed p, any given small positive number ε, and any given large positive number c (for example c = 1000), n may be specified so that:
for n ≥ n 0 (ε, c). The context: X is the number of successes in n binomial trials relating to sampling with replacement from a collection of r + s items, of which r were "fertile" and s "sterile", so that p = r/(r + s). ε was taken as 1/(r + s). His conclusion was that 2 E. Seneta n 0 (ε, c) could be taken as the integer greater than or equal to:
t max log c(s − 1) log(r + 1) − log r 1 + s r + 1 − s r + 1 ,
log c(r − 1) log(s + 1) − log s 1 + r s + 1 − r s + 1 where t = r + s. The notation c, r, s, t is Bernoulli's and the form of the lower bound for n 0 (ε, c) is largely his notation.
There is already a clear understanding of the concept of an event as a subset of outcomes, of probability of an event as the proportion of outcomes favourable to the event, and of the binomial distribution:
n−x , x = 0, 1, 2, . . ., n,
for the number X of occurrences of the event in n binomial trials. Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem has two central features. The first is that the greater the number of observations, the less the uncertainty. That is: in a probabilistic sense later formalized as "convergence in probability", relative frequencies of occurrence of an event in independent repetitions of an experiment approach the probability of occurrence of the event as sample size increases. It is in this guise that Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem appears as the first limit theorem of probability theory, and in frequentist mathematical statistics as the notion of a consistent estimator of a parameter (in this case the parameter p).
The first central feature also reflects, as a mathematical theorem, the empirically observed "statistical regularity" in nature, where independent repetitions of a random experiment under uniform conditions result in observed stability of large sample relative frequency of an event.
The second central feature, less stressed, is that Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem is an exact result. It is tantamount to obtaining a sample size n large enough for specified accuracy of approximation of p by the proportion X/n. The lower bound on such n may depend on p, as it does in Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem, but even if p is known, the problem of determining the best possible lower bound for n for specified precision is far from straightforward, as we shall demonstrate on one of Bernoulli's examples.
Bernoulli's underlying motivation was, however, the approximation of an unknown p by X/n on the basis of repeated binomial sampling (accumulation of evidence) to specific accuracy. We shall call this the inversion problem. It adds several layers of complexity to both features.
1 − P (7037 ≤ X ≤ 7363) ≥ 1/44.58 = 0.0224316.
Laplace (1814), p. 281, without mentioning Nicolaus anywhere, to illustrate his own approximation, obtains the value P (7037 ≤ X ≤ 7363) = 0.994505 so that 1 − P (7037 ≤ X ≤ 7363) = 0.0056942. The statistical software package R which can calculate binomial sum probabilities gives P (X ≤ 7363) − P (X ≤ 7036) = 0.9943058, so that 1 − P (7037 ≤ X ≤ 7363) = 0.0056942. The difference in philosophical approach is clear: finding n sufficiently large for specific precision (Jacob), and finding the degree of precision for given large n (Nicolaus). While Nicolaus's contribution is a direct bridge to the normal approximation of binomial probabilities for large fixed n as taken up by De Moivre, it does not enhance the limit theorem direction of Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem, as De Moivre's Theorem, from which the normal approximation for large n to binomial probabilities emerges, was to do.
After Paris, in early 1713 at Montmort's country estate, Nicolaus helped Montmort prepare the second edition of his book (Montmort (1713) ), and returned to Basel in April, 1713, in time to write a preface to Ars Conjectandi which appeared in August 1713, a few months before Montmort's (1713) .
Nicolaus, Pierre Rémond de Montmort (1678 Montmort ( -1719 and Abraham De Moivre (1667 -1754 were the three leading figures in what Hald (2007) calls "the great leap forward" in stochastics, which is how Hald describes the period from 1708 to the first edition of De Moivre's (1718) Doctrine of Chances.
In his preface to Ars Conjectandi in 1713, Nicolaus says of the fourth part that Jacob intended to apply what had been exposited in the earlier parts of Ars Conjectandi, to civic, moral and economic questions, but due to prolonged illness and untimely onset of death, Jacob left it incomplete. Describing himself as too young and inexperienced to do this appropriately, Nicolaus decided to let the Ars Conjectandi be published in the form in which its author left it. As Csörgö (2001) comments: Jakob's programme, or dream rather, was wholly impossible to accomplish in the eighteenth century. It is impossible today, and will remain so, in the sense that it was understood then.
De Moivre
De Moivre's motivation was to approximate sums of individual binomial probabilities when n is large, and the probability of success in a single trial is p. Thus, when X ∼ B(n, p). His initial focus was on the symmetric case p = 1/2 and large n, thus avoiding the complication of approximating an asymmetric binomial distribution by a symmetric distribution, the standard normal. In the English translation of his 1733 paper (this is the culminating paper on this topic; a facsimile of its opening pages is in Stigler (1986) , p. 74), De Moivre (1738) praises the work of Jacob and Nicolaus Bernoulli on the summing of several terms of the binomial (a + b) n when n is large, which De Moivre had already briefly described in his Miscellanea Analytica of 1730, but says:
. . . yet some things were further required; for what they have done is not so much an Approximation as the determining of very wide limits, within which they demonstrated that the sum of the terms was contained.
De Moivre's approach is in the spirit of Nicolaus Bernoulli's, not least in that he seeks a result for large n, and proceeds by approximation of individual terms.
As with Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem the limit theorem aspect of De Moivre's result, effectively the Central Limit Theorem for the standardized proportion of successes in n binomial trials as n → ∞, is masked, and the approximating value for sums of binomial probabilities is paramount.
Nevertheless, De Moivre's results provide a strikingly simple, good, and easy to apply approximation to binomial sums, in terms of an integral of the normal density curve. He discovered this curve though he did not attach special significance to it. Stigler (1986) 
where 0 < p = 1 − q < 1 over the range |x − np| ≤ s √ npq, approaches as n → ∞, for any s > 0 the limit (quoted by Stigler (1986) , p. 85). The theological connotations of empirical statistical regularity in the context of free will and its opposite, determinism, are elaborated in Seneta (2003) .
De Moivre's (1733) result also gives an answer to estimating precision of the relative frequency X/n as an estimate of an unknown p, for given n; or of determining n for given precision (the inverse problem), in frequentist fashion, using the inequality I shall here translate a Paper of mine which was printed November 12, 1733, and communicated to some Friends, but never yet made public, reserving to myself the right of enlarging my own thoughts, as occasion shall require.
In his Miscellanea Analytica, Book V, De Moivre displays a detailed study of the work of the Bernoullis in 1713, and distinguishes clearly, on p. 28, between the approaches of Jacob in 1713 of finding an n sufficiently large for specified precision, and of Nicolaus of assessing precision for fixed n for the "futurum probabilitate", thus alluding to the fact that the work was for a general, and to be estimated, p.
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The first edition of De Moivre's Doctrine of Chances had appeared in 1718. In this book there are a number of references to the work of both Jacob and Nicolaus but only within a games of chance setting, in particular to the work of Nicolaus as presented in Montmort (1713) , and it is in this games of chance context that later French authors generally cite the Doctrine of Chances, characteristically giving no year of publication.
The life and probabilistic work of De Moivre is throughly described also in Schneider (1968 Schneider ( , 2006 , and Bellhouse (2011).
Laplace. The inversion problem. Lacroix. The centenary
In a paper of 1774 (Laplace (1986) ) which Stigler (1986) regards as foundational for the problem of predictive probability, Pierre Simon de Laplace (1749 Laplace ( -1827 sees that Bayes's Theorem provides a means to solution of Jacob Bernoulli's inversion problem.
Laplace considers binomial trials with success probability x in each trial, assuming x has uniform prior distribution on (0, 1), and calculates the posterior distribution of the success probability random variable Θ after observing p successes and q failures. Its density is:
and Laplace proves that for any given w > 0, δ > 0
for large p, q. This is a Bayesian analogue of Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem, the beginning of Bayesian estimation of success probability of binomial trials and of Bayesian-type limit theorems of LLN and Central Limit kind. Early in the paper Laplace takes the mean
of the posterior distribution as his total [predictive] probability on the basis of observing p and q, and (8) is what we now call the Bayes estimator.
There is a brief mention in Laplace's paper of De Moivre's Doctrine of Chances (no doubt the 1718 edition) at the outset, but in a context different from the Central Limit problem. There is no mention of Jacob Bernoulli, Stirling (whose formula he uses, but which he cites as sourced from the work of Euler), or Bayes. The paper of 1774 appears to be a work of still youthful exuberance.
In his preliminary Discours to his Essai, Condorcet (1785), p. viij, speaks of the relation between relative frequency and probability, and has a footnote: 8
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For these two demonstrations, see the third part of the Ars Conjectandi of Jacob Bernoulli, a work full of genius, and one of those of which one may regret that this great man had begun his mathematical career so late, and whose death has too soon interrupted. Lacroix (1816) , who had been a pupil of J.A.N. de Caritat de Condorcet (1743 Condorcet ( -1794 , writes on p. 59 about Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem, and has a footnote:
It is the object of the 4th Part of the Ars Conjectandi. This posthumous work, published in 1713, already contains the principal foundations of the philosophy of the probability calculus, but it remained largely obscured until Condorcet recalled, perfected and extended it.
Condorcet was indeed well-versed with the work of Jacob Bernoulli, and specifically the Ars Conjectandi, to which the numerous allusions in the book of Bru-Crepel (Condorcet (1994) ) testify.
Lacroix (1816) Nevertheless, Laplace (1814) is an outstanding epoch in the development of probability theory. It connects well with what had gone before and with our present history of the LLN, and mightily influenced the future. Laplace's (1814) p. 275 ff, Chapitre III, Des lois de probabilité, qui resultent de la multiplication indéfinie desévenémens is frequentist in approach, contains De Moivre's Theorem, and in fact adds a continuity correction term (p. 277):
Laplace remarks that this is an approximation to O(n −1 ) providing np is an integer, and then applies it to Nicolaus Bernoulli's example (see our Section 2). On p. 282 he 6 The influence of Lacroix's (1816) book is particularly evident in the subsequent more statistical direction of French probability in the important book of Cournot (1843) , as the copious and incisive notes of the editor, Bernard Bru, of its reprinting of 1984 make clear.
7 See our Section 11.2 for a precise statement.
inverts (9) to give an interval for p centred onp = X/n, but the ends of the interval still depend on the unknown p, which Laplace replaces byp, since n is large. This gives an interval of random length, in fact a confidence interval in modern terminology, for p. . . . an elegant and simple expression that the difference between these two ratios will be contained within the given limits.
Finally, of relevance to our present theme is a subsection (pp. 67-70) entitled: Théorèmes sur le developpement en séries des fonctions de plusieurs variables. Here Laplace considers, using their generating functions, sums of independent integer-valued but not necessarily identically distributed random variables, and obtains a Central Limit Theorem. The idea of inhomogeneous sums and averages leads directly into subsequent French (Poisson) and Russian (Chebyshev) directions.
Poisson's Law of Large Numbers and Chebyshev

Poisson's Law
The major work in probability of Siméon Denis Poisson (1781-1840) was his book 8 of 1837: Recherches sur la probabilité. It is largely a treatise in the tradition of, and a sequel to, that of his great predecessor Laplace's (1814) Théorie analytique in its emphasis on the large sample behaviour of averages. The theorem of Jacques Bernouilli [sic] [Jacob Bernoulli] is mentioned in 5 places, scattered over pp. iij to p. 205. Laplace receives multiple mentions on 16 pages. Bayes, as "Blayes", is mentioned twice on just one page, and in connection with Laplace. What follows is clearly in the sense of Laplace, with the prior probability values for probability of success in binomial trials being determined by occurrence of one of a range of "causes". Condorcet is mentioned twice, and Pascal at the beginning, but there is no mention of Montmort, let alone Nicolaus Bernoulli, nor of De Moivre.
The term Loi des grands nombres [Law of Large Numbers] appears for the first time in the history of probability on p. 7 of Poisson (1837) , within the statement;
Things of every kind of nature are subject to a universal law which one may well call the Law of Large Numbers. It consists in that if one observes large numbers 10 E. Seneta of events of the same nature depending on causes which are constant and causes which vary irregularly, . . ., one finds that the proportions of occurrence are almost constant . . .
There are two versions of a LLN in Poisson's treatise. The one most emphasized by him has at any one of n binomial trials, each of a fixed number a of causes operate equiprobably, that is, with probability 1/a, occurrence of the ith cause resulting in observed success with probability p i , i = 1, 2, . . . , a. Thus in each of n independent trials the probability of success isp(a) = n i=1 p i /a. So if X is the number of successes in n trials, for sufficiently large n,
for any prespecified ε, Q. Poisson (1837) proved this directly, not realizing that it follows directly from Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem. The LLN which Poisson (1837) considered first, and is now called Poisson's Law of Large Numbers, has probability of success in the ith trial fixed, at p i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. He showed that
for sufficiently large n, using Laplace's Central Limit Theorem for sums of non-identically distributed random variables. The special case where p i = p, i = 1, 2, . . . gives Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem, so Poisson's LLN is a genuine generalization. Inasmuch asp(n) itself need not even converge as n → ∞, Poisson's LLN displays as a primary aspect loss of variability of proportions X/n as n → ∞, rather than a tendency to stability, which Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem established under the restriction p i = p.
Chebyshev's thesis and paper
The magisterial thesis, Chebyshev (1845) , at Moscow University of Pafnutiy Lvovich Chebyshev (1821 Chebyshev ( -1894 , begun in 1841 and defended in 1846, but apparently published in Russian in 1845, was entitled An Essay in Elementary Analysis of the Theory of Probabilities.
9 It gives as its motivation, dated 17 October (o.s) 1844 , pp. 112-113):
To show without using transcendental analysis the fundamental theorems of the calculus of probabilities and their main applications, to serve as a support for all branches of knowledge, based on observations and evidence . . . Dominant driving forces for the application of probability theory in Europe, Great Britain, and the Russian Empire in those times were retirement funds and insurance
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and Russian institutions such as the Yaroslavl Demidov Lycée, within the Moscow Educational Region, had no textbooks. Such a textbook was to involve only "elementary methods".
As a consequence, Chebyshev's magisterial dissertation used no calculus, only algebra, with what would have been integrals being sums throughout, but was nevertheless almost entirely theoretical, giving a rigorous analytical discussion of the then probability theory, with a few examples. Throughout, the quantity e −x 2 figures prominently. The dissertation concludes with a table of what are in effect tail probabilities of the standard normal distribution. Much of the thesis is in fact devoted to producing these very accurate tables (correct to 7 decimal places) by summation.
Laplace's (1814) Chapitre VI, on predictive probability, is adapted by Chebyshev to the circumstances. In Laplace's writings, the prior distribution is envisaged as coming about as the result of "causes", resulting in corresponding values being attached to the possible values in (0, 1) of a success probability, the attached value depending on which "cause" occurs. If causes are deemed to be "equiprobable", the distribution of success probability is uniform in (0, 1).
Chebyshev stays "discrete", so, for example, he takes i s , i = 1, 2, . . . , s − 1 as the possible values (the sample space) of the prior probability in (0, 1) of (s − 1) equiprobable causes, the probability of each of the causes being 1 s−1 . Thus if r occurrences of an event E ("success") are observed in n trials, the posterior distribution is given by:
Examples are also motivated by Laplace (1814) , who in the same chapter begins Section 28, p. 377, with the following:
It is principally to births that the preceding analysis is applicable.
Chebyshev's (1845) thesis concludes Section 26,which is within Chapter IV, with:
Investigations have shown that of 215 599 newborns in France 110 312 were boys.
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He then calculates that the probability that the posterior random variable Θ satisfies
by taking r/n = 110312/215599 = 0.511653579, and using (in modern notation):
and his tables of the standardized normal random variable. (Using the statistical software R for the standard normal variable gives 0.9999709.)
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Chebyshev is clearly well acquainted with not only the work of Laplace, but also the work of De Moivre, Bayes and Stirling, although he cites none of these authors explicitly. Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem is mentioned at the end of Chebyshev's (1845) thesis, Section 20, where he proceeds to obtain as an approximation to the binomial probability:
2 /2p(1−p)µ using the (Stirling) approximation x! = √ 2πx x+1/2 e −x which he says is the "form usually used in probability theory". But he actually obtains bounds for x! directly.
12 Much of Chapter III is in fact dedicated to finding such bounds, as he says at the outset to this chapter.
Such careful bounding arguments (rather than approximative asymptotic expressions) are characteristic of Chebyshev's work, and of the Russian probabilistic tradition which came after him. This is very much in the spirit of the bounds in Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem.
Poisson's (1837) Recherches sur la probabilité came to Chebyshev's attention after the publication of Chebyshev (1845) , but the subtitle of Chebyshev (1846) suggests that the content of Chebyshev (1846) , motivated by Poisson's LLN was used in the defense of the dissertation in 1846 (Bernstein (1945) ).
The only explicit citation in Chebyshev (1846) is to Poisson (1837) , Chapitre IV, although Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem is acknowledged as a special case of Poisson's LLN. In his Section 1 Chebyshev says of Poisson's LLN:
All the same, no matter how ingenious the method utilized by the splendid geometer, it does not provide bounds on the error in this approximative analysis, and, in consequence of this lack of degree of error, the derivation lacks appropriate rigour.
Chebyshev (1846) in effect repeats his bounds for the homogeneous case (p i = p = 1, 2, . . . , n) of binomial trials which he dealt with in Chebyshev (1845), Section 21, to deal with the present inhomogeneous case. He also uses generating functions for sums in the manner of Laplace (1814) .
Here is his final result, where as usual X stands for the number of successes in n trials, p i is the probability of success in the ith trial, and
where:
. (12) Structurally, (11), (12) are very similar to Jacob Bernoulli's expressions in his Theorem, so it is relevant to compare what they give in his numerical example when z = 1/50, p = 30/50 = 0.6, Q = 1/1001 = 0.000999001. The answer appears to be n ≥ 12241.293, i.e., n ≥ 12242.
In spite of the eminence of the journal (Crelle's) in which Chebyshev (1846) published, and the French language in which he wrote, the paper passed unnoticed among the French mathematicians, to whom what we now call Poisson's LLN remained an object of controversy. In his historically important follow-up to the Laplacian analytical tradition of probability (see Bru, Bru and Eid (2012) ), Laurent (1873) gives a proof of Poisson's Law of Large Numbers. He uses characteristic functions, and gives a careful consideration of the error, and hence of convergence rate. However Sleshinsky (1892), in his historical Foreward, claims Laurent's proof contains an error which substantially alters the conclusion on convergence rate. Laurent (1873) cites a number of Bienaymé's papers, but does not appear to use the simple proof of Poisson's LLN which follows from the Bienaymé-Chebyshev Inequality, which by 1873 had been known for some time.
Bienaymé and Chebyshev
Bienaymé's motivation
The major early work of Irenée Jules Bienaymé (1796-1878): De la durée de la vie en France (1837), on the accuracy of life tables as used for insurance calculations, forced the abandonment of the Duvillard table in France in favour of the Deparcieux table. He was influenced in the writing of this paper not least by the demographic content of Laplace's Théorie analytique.
Bienaymé, well aware of Poisson (1837) vehemently disapproved of the term "Law of Large Numbers" (Heyde and Seneta (1977) , Section 3.3), thinking that it did not exist as a separate entity from Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem, not understanding the version of Poisson's Law where a fixed probability of success, p i is associated with the i-th trial, i = 1, 2, . . . . As a consequence of his misunderstanding, in 1839 (Heyde and Seneta (1977) , Section 3.2) Bienaymé proposes a scheme of variation of probabilities (that is, of "genuine" inhomogeneity of trials, as opposed to the other version of Poisson's Law which does not differ from Jacob Bernoulli's) through a principle of durée des causes [persistence of causes]. Suppose there are a causes, say c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c a , the i-th cause giving rise to probability p i , i = 1, 2, . . . , a of success. Each cause may occur equiprobably for each one of m sets of n trials; but once chosen it persists for the whole set. The case n = 1 is of course the "other" Poisson scheme which is tantamount to Jacob Bernoulli's sampling scheme with success probabilityp(a).
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For his scheme of N = mn trials Bienaymé writes down a Central Limit result with correction term to the normal integral in the manner of Laplace's version of De Moivre's Theorem for Bernoulli trials, to which Bienaymé's result reduces when n = 1.
Schemes of m sets of n binomial trials underlie Dispersion Theory, the study of homogeneity and stability of repeated trials, which was a predecessor of the "continental direction of statistics". Work on Dispersion Theory proceeded through Lexis, Bortkiewicz and Chuprov; and eventually, through the correspondence between Markov and Chuprov, manifested itself in another branch of the evolutionary tree of the LLN of repeated trials founded on Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem. (See Heyde and Seneta (1977) , Chapter 3.)
The Bienaymé-Chebyshev Inequality
Bienaymé (1853) shows mathematically that for the sample meanX of independently and identically distributed random variables whose population mean is µ and variance is σ 2 , so EX = µ, VarX = σ 2 /n, then for any t > 0:
The proof which Bienaymé uses is the simple one we use in the classroom today to prove the inequality by proving that for any ε > 0, providing EX 2 < ∞, and µ = EX:
This is commonly referred to in probability theory as the Chebyshev Inequality, and less commonly as the Bienaymé-Chebyshev Inequality. If the X i , i = 1, 2, . . . are independently but not necessarily identically distributed, and S n = X 1 + X 2 + · · · + X n , putting X = S n in (14), and using the Bienaymé equality Var S n = n i=1 Var X i , (14) reads:
This inequality was obtained by Chebyshev (1867) for discrete random variables and published simultaneously in French and Russian. Bienaymé (1853) was reprinted immediately preceding the French version in Liouville's journal. In 1874 Chebyshev wrote:
The simple and rigorous demonstration of Bernoulli's law to be found in my note entitled: Des valeurs moyennes, is only one of the results easily deduced from the method of M. Bienaymé, which led him, himself, to demonstrate a theorem on probabilities, from which Bernoulli's law follows immediately . . . Actually, not only the limit theorem aspect of Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem is covered by the Bienaymé-Chebyshev Inequality, but also the inversion aspect 13 even for unspecified p.
Further, Chebyshev (1874) formulates as: "the method of Bienaymé" what later became known as the method of moments. Chebyshev (1887) used this method to prove the first version of the Central Limit Theorem for sums of independently but not identically distributed summands; and it was quickly taken up and generalized by Markov. Markov and Liapunov were Chebyshev's most illustrious students, and Markov was ever a champion of Bienaymé as regards priority of discovery. See Heyde and Seneta (1977) , Section 5.10, for details, and Seneta (1984) 14 for a history of the Central Limit problem in pre-Revolutionary Russia.
7. Life tables, insurance, and probability in Britain.
De Morgan
From the mid 1700s, there had been a close association between games of chance and demographic and official statistics with respect to calculation of survival probabilities from life tables. Indeed games of chance and demographic statistics were carriers of the nascent discipline of probability. There was a need for, and activity towards, a reliable science of risk based on birth statistics and life tables by insurance companies and superannuation funds (Heyde and Seneta (1977) , Sections 2.2-2.3). De Moivre's (1725) Annuities upon Lives was a foremost source in England. John William Lubbock (1803-1865) is sometimes described as "the foremost among English mathematicians in adopting Laplace's doctrine of probability". With John Elliott Drinkwater (Later Drinkwater-Bethune) (1801-1859), he published anonymously a 64 page elementary treatise on probability (Lubbock and Drinkwater-Bethune (1830) ). Lubbock's slightly younger colleague, Augustus De Morgan (1806-1871), was making a name for himself as mathematician, actuary and academic. The paper of Lubbock (1830) attempts to address and correct current shortcomings of life tables used at the time in England. He praises Laplace's Théorie analytique in respect of its Bayesian approach, and applies this approach to multinomial distributions of observations, to obtain in particular probabilities of intervals symmetric about the mean via a normal limiting distribution.
Lubbock very likely used the 1820 edition of the Théorie analytique, since his colleague De Morgan was in 1837 to review this edition. De Morgan's chief work on probability was, consequently, a lengthy article in the Encyclopedia Metropolitana usually cited as of 1845, but published as separatum in 1837 (De Morgan (1837) ). This was primarily a summary, simplification and clarification of many of Laplace's derivations. It was the first full-length exposition of Laplacian theory and the first major work in English on probability theory.
An early footnote (p. 410) expresses De Morgan's satisfaction that in Lubbock and Drinkwater-Bethune (1830) there is a collection in English, "and in so accessible a form" on "problems on gambling which usually fill works on our subject", so he has no compunction in throwing most of these aside "to make room for principles" in the manner of, though not necessarily in the methodology of, Laplace. There is no mention of De Moivre or Bayes.
On p. 413, Section 48, which is on "the probability of future events from those which are past", De Morgan addresses the same problem as Lubbock (1830) . Using the multinomial distribution for the prior probabilities, he calculates the posterior distribution by Bayes's Theorem, and this is then used to find the joint distribution from further drawings. Stirling's formula (with no attribution) is introduced in Section 70. A discussion of the normal approximation to the binomial follows in Section 74, pp. 431-434. We could find no mention as such of Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem or De Moivre's Theorem. Section 74 is concluded by Nicolaus Bernoulli's example, which is taken directly from Laplace: with success probability 18/35, and 14 000 trials, P (7200 − 163 ≤ X ≤ 7200 + 163) is considered, for which De Morgan obtains 0.99433 (a little closer to the true value 0.99431 than Laplace). Section 77, p. 434, addresses "the inverse question" of prediction given observations and prior distribution.
De Morgan (1838) published An Essay on Probabilities, designed for the use of actuaries. The book, clearly written and much less technical than De Morgan (1837) remained widely used in the insurance industry for many years. It gave an interesting perception of the history up to that time, especially of the English contributions. On pp. v-viii De Morgan says:
At the end of the seventeenth century, the theory of probability was contained in a few isolated problems, which had been solved by Pascal, Huyghens, James Bernoulli, and others. . . . Montmort, James Bernoulli, and perhaps others, had made some slight attempts to overcome the mathematical difficulty; but De Moivre, one of the most profound analysts of his day, was the first who made decided progress in the removal of the necessity for tedious operations . . . when we look at the intricate analysis by which Laplace obtained the same [results], . . . De Moivre nevertheless did not discover the inverse method. This was first used by the Rev. T. Bayes, . . . Laplace, armed with the mathematical aid given by De Moivre, Stirling, Euler and others, and being in possession of the inverse principle already mentioned, succeeded . . . in . . . reducing the difficulties of calculation . . . within the reach of an ordinary arithmetician . . . for the solution of all questions in the theory of chances which would otherwise require large numbers of operations. The instrument employed is a table (marked Table I in the Appendix to this work), upon the construction of which the ultimate solution of every problem may be made to depend. Cantelli's (1917) pioneering treatment of the Strong Law of Large Numbers (Seneta (1992) ). Boole's book contains one of the first careful treatments of hypothesis testing on the foundation of Bayes's Theorem.
15 (Rice and Seneta (2005) ). Boole does not appear to pay attention to Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem, nor does he follow Laplacian methods although he shows respect for De Morgan, as one who:
has most fully entered into the spirit of Laplace.
He objects to the uniform prior to express ignorance, and to inverse probability (Bayesian) methods in general, particularly in regard to his discussion of Laplace's Law of Succession. Boole is kinder to Poisson (1837) , whom he quotes at length at the outset of his Chapter XVI: On the Theory of Probabilities. His approach to this theory is in essence set-theoretic, in the spirit of formal logic.
The history of the theory of probability upto and including Laplace, and even some later related materials, appears in the remarkable book of Todhunter (1865) which is still in use today. A whole chapter entitled: Chapter VII. James addresses the whole of the Ars Conjectandi. Sections 123-124, devoted to Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem, begin with:
The most remarkable subject contained in the fourth part of the Ars Conjectandi is the enunciation of what we now call Bernoulli's Theorem.
The theorem is enunciated just as Bernoulli described it; of how large N (n) is to be to give the specified precision. Section 123 ends with: James Bernoulli's demonstration of this result is long but perfectly satisfactory . . . We shall see that James Bernoulli's demonstration is now superseded by the use of Stirling's Theorem.
In Section 124, Todhunter uses Jacob Bernoulli's own examples, including the one we have cited ("for the odds to be 1000 to 1"). Section 125 is on the inversion problem: given the number of successes in n trials, to determine the precision of the estimate of the probability of success. Todhunter concludes by saying that the inversion has been done in two ways, by an inversion of James Bernoulli's Theorem, or by the aid of another theorem called Bayes's theorem; the results approximately agree. See Laplace Théorie Analytique . . . pages 282 and 366.
Section 135 concludes with:
The problems in the first three parts of the Ars Conjectandi cannot be considered equal in importance or difficulty to those which we find investigated by Montmort and De Moivre; but the memorable theorem in the fourth part, which justly bears its author's name, will ensure him a permanent place in the history of the Theory of Probability.
Important here is Todhunter's view that Jacob Bernoulli's proof has been superseded. Only the limit theorem aspect is being perceived, and that as a corollary to De Moivre's Theorem, although in this connection and at this point De Moivre gets no credit, despite Laplace's (1814) full recognition for his theorem.
Crofton and Cook Wilson
Todhunter's limited perception of Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem as only a limit theorem, with Stirling's Theorem as instrument of proof in the manner of De Moivre-Laplace, but without mention of De Moivre, became the standard one in subsequent British probability theory. In his Encyclopaedia Britannica article in the famous 9th edition, Crofton (1885) constructs such a proof (pp. 772-773), using his characteristically geometric approach, to emphasize the approximative use of the normal integral to calculate probabilities, and then concludes with:
Hence it is always possible to increase the number of trials till it becomes certainty that the proportion of occurrences of the event will differ from p (its probability on a single trial ) by a quantity less than any assignable. This is the celebrated theorem given by James Bernoulli in the Ars Conjectandi. (See Todhunter's History, p. 71.) Then Crofton presents the whole issue of Laplace's predictive approach as a consequence of Bayes's Theorem in Section 17 of Crofton (1885) (pp. 774-775), using a characteristically geometric argument, together with Stirling's Theorem.
Crofton's general francophilia is everywhere evident; he had spent a time in France. His concluding paragraph on p. 778, on literature, mentions De Morgan's Encyclopaedia Metropolitana presentation, Boole's book with some disparagement, and a number of French language sources, but he refers:
. . . the reader, . . . above all, to the great work of Laplace, of which it is sufficient to say that it is worthy of the genius of its author -the Théorie analytique des probabilités, . . .
There is a certain duality between De Moivre, a Protestant refugee from Catholic
France to Protestant England, and Crofton, an Anglo-Irish convert to Roman Catholicism in the footsteps of John Henry (Cardinal) Newman, himself an author on probability, and an influence on Crofton, as is evident from its early paragraphs, in Crofton (1885).
Crofton's (1885) article was likely brought to the attention Seneta (2012) of John Cook Wilson , who in Cook Wilson (1901) developed his own relatively simple proof of the limit aspect of "James Bernoulli's Theorem". He uses domination by a geometric progression. His motivation is the simplification of Laplace's proof as presented in Todhunter (1865, Section 993). There is no mention of De Moivre, and dealings with the normal integral are avoided. An interesting feature is that Cook Wilson considers asymmetric bounds for the deviation X n − p, but he does eventually resort to limiting arguments using Stirling's approximation, so the possibility of an exact bounding result in the Bernoulli and Bienaymé-Chebyshev style is lost.
Bertrand
In the book of Bertrand (1907) in the French stream, Chapitre IV contains a proof of De Moivre's Theorem, and mentions both De Moivre and Stirling's Theorem, but there seems to be no mention of "Jacques Bernoulli" in the chapter content, nor a statement of his Theorem, let alone a proof. Chapitre V of Bertrand (1907) has two "demonstrations" which Bertrand (1907, p. 101) describes only in its limit aspect. Bertrand first shows that if X i , i = 1, . . . , n are independently and identically distributed, and EX 2 1 < ∞, then VarX = Var X1 n → 0, n → ∞ and then simply applies this to the case when P (X 1 = 1) = p, P (X 1 = 0) = q = 1 − p. There is no mention of the Bienaymé-Chebyshev Inequality or its authors. That VarX → 0 is deemed sufficient for "convergence" one might charitably equate to foreshadowing convergence in mean square. In the final section of Chapitre V, Section 80, p. 101, Bertrand (1907) asserts that he will give a demonstration to the theorem of Bernoulli even simpler than the preceding. What follows is a demonstration that for {0, 1} random variables X i , i = 1, . . . , n, E|X − p| → 0, n → ∞ without the need to calculate E| n i=1 X i − np|. The reader will see that this actually follows easily from VarX → 0. The "exact aspect" of Jacob Bernoulli's theorem has disappeared.
K. Pearson
In a perceptive paper written in that author's somewhat abrasive style, Karl Pearson (1925) restores credit to De Moivre for his achievement, and refocuses (p. 202) on the need, surely appropriate for a mathematical statistician, to obtain a better expression for sample size, n, needed for specified accuracy.
In his Section 2, Pearson reproduces the main features of Jacob Bernoulli's proof, and shows how the normal approximation to the binomial in the manner of De Moivre can be used to determine n for specified precision if p is known. In Section 3, Pearson tightens up Bernoulli's proof keeping the same expressions for p = r r+s and ε = 1 r+s , by using a geometric series bounding procedure and then Stirling's Theorem. There is no mention of Cook Wilson's (1901) work. Recall that if p = 1 2 one problem with the normal approximation to the normal is that asymmetry about its mean of the binomial is not reflected in the normal. Thus in considering c c + 1
involves binomial tails of differing probability size. A commensurate aspect in Pearson (1925) is the treatment of the tails of the binomial distribution individually. The approximation is remarkably good, giving for Bernoulli's example where r = 30, s = 20, p = 3 5 , c = 1000, ε = 1 50 the result n 0 (ε, c) ≥ 6502, which is almost the same as for the normal approximation to the binomial (6498). The reason is similar: the use of the De Moivre-Stirling approximation for x!, and the fact that p = 0.6 is close to p = 0.5, which is the case of symmetric binomial (when it is known that a correction for continuity such as Laplace's with the normal probability function gives very accurate results). Pearson does not attempt the inversion (that is, the determination of n when p is not known) in Jacob Bernoulli's example.
9. Sample size and emerging bounds 9.1. Sample size in Bernoulli's example For this classical example when p = 0.6, referring to (16), we seek the smallest n to satisfy 0.9990009999 = 1000 1001
where X ∼ B(n, 0.6). Using R, n = 6491 on the right hand side gives 0.9990126, while n = 6490 gives 0.9989679, so the minimal n which will do is 6491, providing the algorithm in R is satisfactory. Chebyshev's (1846) inequality for inhomogeneous binomial trials, when applied to a homogeneous situation, gives, as we have seen, a much sharper "exact" result for minimal n (namely, n ≥ 12242) for p = 0.6 than Bernoulli's, but, like Jacob Bernoulli's, was incapable of explicit algebraic inversion when p was unknown.
In his monograph (in the 3rd edition, Markov (1913) , this is on p. 74) Markov uses the normal approximation with known p = 0.6 in Bernoulli's example to obtain that n ≥ 6498 is required for the specified accuracy.
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In the tradition of Chebyshev, and in the context of his controversy with Nekrasov (see our Section 10.1), Markov (1899) had developed a method using continued fractions to obtain tight bounds for binomial probabilities when p is known and n is also prespecified. The method is described and illustrated in Uspensky (1937 ), pp. 52-56. On p. 74, Markov (1913 argues that the upper bound 0.999 on accuracy is likely to hold also for n not much greater than the approximative 6498 which he had just obtained, say n = 6520. On pp. 161-165 he verifies this, showing that the probability when n = 6520 is between 0.999028 and 0.999044. Using R the true value is 0.9990309. Thus Markov's procedure is an exact procedure for inversion when p and accuracy are prespecified, once one has an approximative lower bound for n. One could then proceed experimentally, as we have done using R, looking for the smallest n.
To effect "approximative" inversion if we did not know the value of p, to get the specified accuracy of the estimate of p presuming n would still be large, we could use De Moivre's Theorem and the "worst case" bound p(1 − p) ≤ where P (|Z| ≤ z 0 ) = 0.999001. Again the result 6767 is good since p = 0.6 is not far from the worst case value p = 0.5. The now commonly used substitution of the estimatep from a preliminary performance of the binomial experiment in place of p in p(1 − p) (and this is implicit in Laplace's use of his add-on correction to the normal to effect inversion) would improve the inversion result.
Improving Stirling's approximation and the normal approximation
The De Moivre-Laplace approximative methods are based on Stirling's approximation for the factorial. They can be refined by obtaining bounds for the factorial. Such bounds were already present in an extended footnote in Chebyshev (1846):
where T 0 is a positive constant. This was later refined 17 to
where 0 < θ < 1.
It was therefore to be expected that De Moivre's Theorem could be made more precise by producing bounds. De La Vallée-Poussin (1907) in the second of two papers (see Seneta (2001a) ) considers the sum P = x n x p x q n−x over the range |x − (n + 1)p + 1 2 | < (n + 1)l for arbitrary fixed l, and obtains the bounds for P in terms of the normal integral. A bound for minimal sample size n required for specified accuracy of approximation could be determined, at least when p was known. Although this work seems to have passed largely unnoticed, it presages the return of "exact methods" via bounds on the deviation of normal approximation to the binomial. These bounds imply a convergence rate of O(n −1/2 ). A cycle of related bounding procedures is initiated in Bernstein (1911) . He begins by saying that he has not found a rigorous estimate of the accuracy of the normal approximation ("Laplace's formula") to P (|X − np| < z np(1 − p)). He illustrates his own investigations by showing when: p = 1/2, n is an odd number, and 1/2 + z (n + 1)/2 is an integer, that:
where Φ(z) = P (Z ≤ z) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable Z ∼ N (0, 1). He illustrates in the case z = 2.25, n = 199, so that the right-hand side 18 of (20) is 0.9985373. This value is thus a lower bound for P (77 ≤ X ≤ 122). Bernstein (1911) then inverts, by finding that if Φ(z 0 ) = 0.9985373, then this value normal approximation corresponds to P (77.05 ≤ X ≤ 121.9) = P (78 ≤ X ≤ 121). This testifies not only 22 E. Seneta to the accuracy of "Laplace's formula" as approximation, but also to the sharpness of Bernstein's bound even for moderate size of n, albeit in the very specific situation of p = 1/2. The accuracy of Laplace's formula became a central theme in Bernstein's subsequent probabilistic work. There is a strong thematic connection between Bernstein's striking work on probabilistic methods in approximation theory in those early pre-war years to about 1914, in Kharkov, and De La Vallée Poussin's approximation theory. See our Section 11.3.
The Russian stream. Statistical dependence and
Bicentenary celebrations
Nekrasov and Markov
Nekrasov (1898a) is a summary paper containing no proofs. It is dedicated to the memory of Chebyshev, on account of Nekrasov's continuation of Chebyshev's work on Central Limit theory in it. The author, P.A. Nekrasov (1853 Nekrasov ( -1924 , attempted to use what we now call the method of saddle points, of Laplacian peaks, and of the Lagrange inversion formula, to establish, for sums of independent non-identically distributed lattice random variables, what are now standard local and global limit theorems of Central Limit theory for large deviations. A follow-up paper, Nekrasov (1898b) dealt exclusively with binomial trials. Markov's (1898) first rigorization, within correspondence with A.V. Vasiliev (1853 Vasiliev ( -1929 , of Chebyshev's version of the Central Limit Theorem, appeared in the Kazan-based journal edited by Vasiliev. The three papers of 1898 mark the beginning of two bitter controversies between Nekrasov and Markov, details of whose technical and personal interaction are described in Seneta (1984) .
Nekrasov's writings from about 1898 had become less mathematically focused, partly due to administrative load, and partly due to his use of statistics as a propagandist tool of state and religious authority (Tsarist government and the Russian Orthodox Church).
In a long footnote (Nekrasov (1902) , pp. 29-31), states "Chebyshev's Theorem" as follows: If X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n are independently distributed andX n = (X 1 + X 2 + · · ·+ X n )/n then
where τ is a given positive number, and
He adds that if τ (= τ n ) can be chosen so that τ n √ g n → 0 while simultaneously nτ Nekrasov says (Seneta (1984) ) that he has examined the "theoretical underpinnings of Chebyshev's Theorem", and has come to the [correct] conclusion that if in the above g n is defined as g n = n VarX n , the inequality continues to hold. Now, in general,
so the original expression for g n results from just "pairwise independence" (i.e. all Cov(X i , X j ) = 0, i < j).
Hence if under merely pairwise independence τ n can be chosen so that τ n √ g n → 0, the LLN will hold. Thus (under this latter condition) pairwise independence is sufficient for the LLN. This is an important advance: a first step for the LLN to hold under a condition weaker than the hitherto assumed mutual independence.
Nekrasov (1902), p. 29, then boldly states that Chebyshev's Theorem 19 attains its "full force" under the condition that the X i , i ≥ 1 are pairwise independent.
There is little doubt from his context that Nekrasov is asserting that pairwise independence is necessary for the LLN to hold. Markov saw that this was not correct, and proceeded to construct a counterexample: the first "Markov" chain (Seneta (1996) ).
All that was needed was an example of dependence where g n = n VarX n and τ n is such that τ 2 n g n → 0, while simultaneously nτ 2 n → 0. Still publishing in his friend Vasiliev's journal, Markov (1906) , Sections 2 and 5, does almost precisely this (Seneta (1996) , Section 5). He constructs in fact, as his general scheme of dependent variables {X n }, n ≥ 1, a finite Markov chain, which he takes to be time homogeneous with all transition probabilities p ij strictly positive. He shows that EX n has a limit, a, as n → ∞ (that limit is in fact the mean of the limiting-stationary distribution), and then uses the Bienaymé-Chebyshev Inequality to show that P (|X n − a| ≥ ε) → 0 as n → ∞.
The last sentence of Markov (1906) reads (without mention of Nekrasov):
Thus, independence of quantities does not constitute a necessary condition for the existence of the law of large numbers.
Chuprov and Markov
In his book (Chuprov (1909) ) which was a pioneering and fundamental influence on statistics in the Russian Empire, Essays on the Theory of Statistics, A.A. Chuprov (1874 Chuprov ( -1926 speaks of the following ideological conflict in thinking about the LLN, especially in Russia. The LLN is a mathematical theorem. It reflects an empirical fact: observed long-term stability of the proportion of successes in independent binomial trials, but does not explain its cause (Seneta (2003) ). The consequent Markov-Chuprov Correspondence (Ondar (1981) ) lasted from 2 November 1910 to about 27 February 1917, and marks the coming together of probability 24 E. Seneta theory and statistics (in the form of Dispersion Theory) into mathematical statistics in the Russian Empire. The Correspondence itself was largely concerned, in the tradition of the Lexis-Bortkiewicz theory, with the study of variants of the empirical dispersion coefficient. A full account of Dispersion Theory more broadly is in Heyde and Seneta (1977) , Section 3.4.
The Correspondence refers frequently to the work on Dispersion Theory of Bortkiewicz, a Russian expatriate of Polish ethnicity, in Germany. Bortkiewicz's (1898) book, Das Gesetz der kleinen Zahlen. [The Law of Small Numbers.] (LSN) has earned itself a niche in the history of mathematical statistics. The name is clearly in contrast to Poisson's LLN, but what precisely it describes is unclear. A relatively recent study is by Quine and Seneta (1987) .
The time-span of the Markov-Chuprov Correspondence encompassed the Bicentenary of Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem, and this did not pass unnoticed. In Ondar (1981) Firstly, do you know: the year 1913 is the two hundredth anniversary of the law of large numbers (Ars Conjectandi, 1713 ), and don't you think that this anniversary should be commemorated in some way or other? Personally I propose to put out a new edition of my book, substantially expanded. But I am raising the question about a general celebration with the participation of as large a number of people and institutions as possible.
Then in Ondar (1981) , p. 69, Letter No. 56 (a letter from Markov to Chuprov, 31 January, 1913) anticipates a view which Pearson (1925) was to express even more forcefully later:
. . . Besides you and me, it was proposed to bring in Professor A.V. Vasiliev . . . Then it was proposed to translate only the fourth chapter of Ars Conjectandi; the translation will be done by the mathematician Ya.V. Uspensky, who knows the Latin language well, and it should appear in 1913. Finally, I propose to do a French translation of the supplementary articles in my book with a short foreword about the law of large numbers, as a publication of the Academy of Sciences. All of this should be scheduled for 1913 and a portrait of J. Bernoulli will be attached to all the publications.
In connection with your idea about attracting foreign scholars, I cannot fail to note that the French mathematicians, following the example of Bertrand, do not wish to know what the theorem of Jacob Bernoulli is. In Bertrand's Calcul des Probabilités the fourth chapter is entitled "Théorème de Jacques Bernoulli". the fifth is entitled "Démonstrationélémentaire du théorème de Jacques Bernoulli". But neither a strict formulation of the theorem nor a strict proof is given. . . . Too slight a respect for the theorem of J. Bernoulli is also observed among many Germans. It has reached a point that a certain Charlier . . . showed a complete lack of familiarity with the theorem.
A.V. Vasiliev (1853 Vasiliev ( -1929 was both mathematician and social activist, a Joe Gani of his time and place. Among his interests was the history of mathematics in Russia. He [1907] [1908] [1909] [1910] [1911] [1912] [1913] [1914] [1915] [1916] [1917] [1918] [1919] [1920] [1921] [1922] [1923] . Only slightly older than Markov (1856 Markov ( -1922 , he was instrumental in fostering Markov's work over the period [1898] [1899] [1900] [1901] [1902] [1903] [1904] [1905] [1906] in "his" Kazan journal: the Izvestiia of the Physico-Mathematical Society of Kazan University.
The Bicentenary in St. Petersburg
The talks were in the order: Vasiliev, Markov, Chuprov. Markov's talk, published in Odessa in 1914 , is in Ondar (1981 in English translation, as Appendix 3, pp. 158-163. Chuprov's much longer talk, also published in 1914, is Appendix 4, pp. 164-181.
Vasiliev (Vassilief (1914) ) presents a brief summary of the whole proceedings, and then in his Sections I, II, III, the respective contributions of the three speakers, in French (in a now-electronically accessible journal). He describes the respective topics as: Vasiliev: Some questions of the theory of probabilities upto the theorem of Bernoulli; Markov: The Law of Large Numbers considered as a collection of mathematical theorems; Chuprov: The Law of Large Numbers in contemporary science.
The content of his own talk is described as giving a historical perception of the development of two fundamental notions: mathematical probability, that is a priori; and empirical probability, that is a posteriori. Vasiliev summarizes Markov's talk well, especially the early part which contrasts Jacob Bernoulli's exact results with the approximative procedures of De Moivre and Laplace, which use the limit normal integral structure to determine probabilities. Markov mentions Laplace's second degree correction, and also comments on the proof of Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem in its limit aspect by way of the De Moivre-Laplace "second limit theorem".
Markov goes on to discuss Poisson's LLN as an approximative procedure ". . . not bounding the error in an appropriate way", and continues with Chebyshev's (1846) proof in Crelle's journal. He then summarizes the Bienaymé-Chebyshev interaction in regard to the Inequality and its application; and the evolution of the method of moments. He strains to remain scrupulously fair to Bienaymé, while according Chebyshev credit, in a way adopted subsequently in Russian-language historiography, for example by S.N. Bernstein (1945) . Markov concludes as follows, in a story which has become familiar.
. . . I return to Jacob Bernoulli. His biographers recall that, following the example of Archimedes he requested that on his tombstone the logarithmic spiral be inscribed with the epitaph "Eadem mutato resurgo". . . . It also expresses Bernoulli's hope for resurrection and eternal life. . . . More than two hundred years have passed since Bernoulli's death but he lives and will live in his theorem.
Chuprov's bicentennial talk contrasts two methods of knowledge: the study of the individual entity, and the study of the collective via averages, "based on the Law of 26 E. Seneta Large Numbers". As an illustration of the success of the latter, Mendel's laws of heredity are cited. What seems to be the essence here is the goodness of fit to a probability model of repeated statistical observations under uniform conditions (statistical sampling).
Markov perceives in such arguments the vexed question of statistical regularity being interpreted as the LLN, which to him (and to us) is a mathematical theorem which, under specific mathematical conditions, only reflects statistical regularity, and does not explain it. He writes, obviously miffed, to Chuprov immediately after the meeting (Ondar (1981 ), Letter No. 62, 3 December 1913 :
In your talk statistics stood first and foremost, and applications of the law of large numbers were advanced that seem questionable to me. By subscribing to them I can only weaken that which for me is particularly dear: the rigor of judgements I permit. . . . Your talk harmonized beautifully with A.V. Vasiliev's talk but in no way with mine. . . . I had to give my talk since the 200th anniversary of a mathematical theorem was being celebrated, but I do not intend to publish it and I do not wish to.
Chuprov's paper as a whole is scholarly and interesting, for example, also mentioning Brown (of Brownian motion), and the Law of Small Numbers as related to the Poisson distribution, and to Abbé and Bortkiewicz.
As anticipated in Markov's letter (Ondar (1981) , No. 56, 31 January 1913) the translation from Latin into Russian by J.V. Uspensky was published in 1913, edited, and with a Foreword, by Markov, and with the now-usual portrait of Jacob Bernoulli. They are reproduced in Bernoulli (1986) with the title Ischislenie Veroiatnostei below, with other information. For the portrait of Jacob Benoulli following the title page, Markov, at the conclusion of his Preface, expresses his gratitude to the chief librarian of Basel University, Dr. Carl Christoph Bernoulli. 11. Markov (1913) Application of the method of mathematical expectations -the method of moments -to the proof of the second limit theorem of the calculus of probabilities.
The first appendix is titled Chebyshev's inequalities and the fundamental theorem and the second Theorem on the limit of probability in the formulations of Academician A.M. Liapunov. In a footnote to the latter, Markov finally attributes the proof of De Moivre's Theorem to De Moivre (1730).
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What is of specific interest to us is what has come to be known as Markov's Inequality 22 : for a non-negative random variable U and positive number u: 
is sufficient for the WLLN to hold, for arbitrary summands {X 1 , X 2 , . . .}. Thus the assumption of independence is dropped, although the assumption of finite individual variances is still retained. In the Russian literature, for example in Bernstein (1927) , p. 177, this is called Markov's Theorem. We shall call it Markov's Theorem 1. Amongst the innovations in this 3rd edition which Markov actually specifies in his Preface is an advanced version of the WLLN which came to be known also as Markov's Theorem, and which we shall call Markov's Theorem 2. We state it in modern form:
where S n = n i=1 X i and the {X i , i = 1, 2, . . .} are independent and satisfy E(|X i | 1+δ ) < C < ∞ for some constants δ > 0 and C. The case δ = 1 came to be known in Russianlanguage literature as Chebyshev's Theorem. Markov's Theorem 2 thus dispenses with the need for finite variance of summands X i , but retains their independence. It occurs in the same Section 16 of Chapter III of Markov (1913) 
he derives the expression
which Markov calls Chebyshev's formula. This paper of Markov's clearly motivated Uspensky (1937) to ultimately resolve the issues through the component (27) of Uspensky's expression.
Bernstein and Uspensky on the WLLN
Markov died in 1922 well after the Bolshevik seizure of power, and it was through the 4th (posthumous) edition of Ischislenie Veroiatnestei (Markov (1924) ) that his results were publicized and extended, in the first instance in the Soviet Union due to the monograph S.N. Bernstein (1927) . The third part of this book (pp. 142-199 ) is titled The Law of Large Numbers and consists of three chapters: Chapter 1: Chebyshev's inequality and its consequences. Chapter 2: Refinement of Chebyshev's Inequaliity. and Chapter 3: Extension of the Law of Large Numbers to dependent quantitities. Chapter 3 begins with Markov's Theorem 1, and continues with study of the effect of specific forms of correlation between the summands forming S n . In Chapter 1, on p. 155 Bernstein mentions Markov's Theorem 2 as a result of the "deceased Academician A.A. Markov" and adds "The reader will find the proof in the textbook of A.A. Markov". A proof is included in the second edition, Bernstein (1934) , in which the three chapters in the third part are almost unchanged from Bernstein (1927) . Bernstein (1924) returned to the problem of accuracy of the normal approximation to the binomial via bounds. He showed that there exists an α(|α| ≤ 1) such that P = x n x p x q n−x summed over x satisfying
2 /2 du + 2θe
where |θ| < 1 for any n, t, provided t 2 /16 ≤ npq ≥ 365. The tool used, perhaps for the first time ever, was what came to be known as Bernstein's Inequality:
namely Markov's Inequality (called Chebyshev's Lemma by Bernstein). It holds for any random variable V , on substituting U = e V ε , u = e vε . If E(e V ε ) < ∞ the bound is particularly effective for a non-negative random variable V such as the binomial, since the bound may be tightened by manipulating ε. In connection with a discussion of (25), Bernstein (1927) , pp. 231-232 points out that, consequently the ordinary (uncorrected) normal integral approximation thus gives adequate accuracy when npq is of size several hundred, but in cases where great accuracy is not required, npq ≥ 30 will do. However, our interest in (25) is in its nature as an exact result and in the suggested rate of convergence, O(n −1 ), to the limit in the WLLN which the bounds provide. The entire issue was resolved into an ultimate exact form, under the partial influence of the extensive treatment of the WLLN in Bernstein's (1927) textbook, by Uspensky (1937, Chapter VII, p. 130 ) who showed that P taken over the usual range t 1 √ npq ≤ x − np ≤ t 2 √ npq for any real numbers t 1 < t 2 , can be expressed (provided npq ≥ 25) as: The symmetric case then follows by putting t 2 = −t 1 = t, so the "Chebyshev" term vanishes. When both np and t √ npq are integers, θ 1 = θ 2 = 0, reducing the correction term in (26) to Laplace's e −t 2 /2 / √ 2πnpq. But in any case, bounds which are within O(n −1 ) of the true value are thus available. Uspensky's (1937) book carried Markov's theory to the English-speaking countries. Uspensky (1937) cites Markov (1924) and Bernstein (1927) in his two-chapter discussion of the LLN. Markov's Theorem 2 is stated and proved in Chapter X, Section 8. Presumably the second (1934) edition of Bernstein's textbook was not available to Uspensky due to circumstances mentioned below. On the other hand in Uspensky (1937) the ideas in the proof of Markov's Theorem 2 are used to prove the now famous "Khinchin's Theorem", an ultimate form of the WLLN. For independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) summands, Khinchin (Khintchine (1929) ) showed that the existence of a finite mean, µ = EX i , is sufficient for (23). Finally, Uspensky (1937) , pp. 101-103, proves the Strong Law of Large Numbers (SLLN) for the setting of Bernoulli's Theorem, and calls this strengthening "Cantelli's Theorem", citing one of the two foundation papers (Cantelli (1917) ) in the history of the SLLN.
On the other hand, Bernstein (1934) , in his third part has an additional Chapter 4: Statistical probabilities, average values and the coefficient of dispersion. It begins with a Bayesian inversion of Jacob Bernoulli's Theorem, proved under a certain condition on the prior (unconditional) distribution of the number of "successes", X, in n trials. The methodology uses Markov's Inequality applied to P ((Θ − 
for n > n 0 and m = 0, 1, . . . , n. This should be compared with (7). Bernstein (1934) also has 4 new appendices. The 4th of these (pp. 406-409) is titled: A Theorem Inverse to Laplace's Theorem. This is the Bayesian inverse of De Moivre's Theorem, with an arbitrary prior density, and convergence to the standard normal integral as m, n → ∞ providing m n behaves appropriately. A version of this theorem is now called the Bernstein-von Mises Theorem, although this attribution is not quite appropriate. After Laplace the multivariate extension of Laplace's inversion is actually due to his disciplele Bienaymé in 1834, and is called by von Mises in 1919 the "Second Fundamental Theorem" (the first being the CLT). Details are given in Section 5.2 of Heyde and Seneta (1977) .
The books of both Bernstein and Uspensky are very much devoted to Markov's work, and Bernstein's also emphasizes and publicizes Markov chains. Several sections of Bernstein's textbook in its 1946 4th edition, such as the 4th appendix, are included in Bernstein's (1964) collected works and have not been published separately.
Biographical notes on Bernstein and Uspensky
Bernstein and Uspensky played parallel and influential roles in publicizing and extending Markov's work, especially on the LLN. These roles were conditioned by their background. To help understand, we sketch these backgrounds. Uspensky's story is almost unknown.
Sergei Natanovich Bernstein (1880 Bernstein ( -1968 was born in Odessa in the then Russian Empire. Although his father was a doctor and university lecturer, the family had difficulties since it was Jewish. On completing high school, Bernstein went to Paris for his mathematical ediucation, and defended a doctoral dissertation in 1904 at the Sorbonne. He returned in 1905 and taught at Kharkov University from 1908 to 1933. In the spirit of his French training and following a Chebyshevian theme, in the years preceding the outbreak of World War I he followed Bernstein (1911) by a number of articles on approximation theory. These included the famous paper of 1912 which presented a probabilistic proof of Weierstrass's Theorem, and introduced what we now call Bernstein Polynomials. A prizewinning paper which contains forms of inverse theorems and Bernstein's Inequality, arose out of a question posed by De La Vallée Poussin. 
They call (32) the Bojanić-Seneta condition.
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Khinchin's Theorem itself was generalized by Feller (see, for example, Feller (1966) Section VII.7) in the spirit of Khintchine (1936) for i.i.d but not necessarily nonnegative summands. Petrov (1995) , Chapter 6, Theorem 4, gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a sequence of constants {b n } such that S n /a n − b n → 0 for any given sequence of positive constants {a n } such that a n → ∞, where the independent summands X i are not necessarily identically distributed.
To conclude this very brief sketch, we draw the reader's attention to a little-known necessary and sufficient condition for (23) to hold, for arbitrarily dependent not necessarily identically distributed random variables (see, for example, Gnedenko (1963) ).
